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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5213
This paper analyzes the finances of Egypt’s listed firms 
and the performance of the Egyptian stock exchange 
during the period 2003-07/08. Egyptian companies 
can be clearly divided into a top tier and a second tier. 
Egypt’s top tier of listed firms tends to finance themselves 
mainly from operating cash flows, trade credits, and other 
short-term borrowing. This raises questions as to whether 
recent performance could have been even better had these 
firms done more in the way of long-term financing and 
long-term investment. This issue is even starker for a large 
This paper—a product of the Policy Development Unit, Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to understand capital market development in Egypt. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at efeijen@worldbank.org.   
second tier of much smaller firms. Regarding the stock 
market, the analysis finds that the Egyptian Exchange 
has experienced extraordinary market capitalization 
growth fueled by strong price increases. Market activity 
has been increasing as well, but reached expected levels 
only recently. Despite strong improvement, however, 
many companies remain illiquid. In its ability to raise 
capital, Egypt seems to do well, but privatizations and 
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1  Introduction 
In recent years, Egypt has been showing impressive economic growth and even outperformed 
other emerging markets with 7.1 percent versus 3.7 percent. Similarly, as a result of economic 
growth, regulatory reform, and strong investor interest, the Egyptian stock market has seen a 
remarkable boom before the global financial crisis erupted. 
 
The objective of this paper is to understand Egypt’s impressive performance and identify further 
obstacles to growth. In doing so, Section 2 studies the performance and financial structure of 
Egyptian listed firms during 2003-07. We focus on four sectors in the real economy – consumer 
staples (food, beverages, personal and household products), cyclical industrial (basic resources, 
chemical, automotive, industrial goods and services), building materials and construction, and 
travel and leisure. We find that Egyptian firms can be clearly divided into a top tier and second 
tier. Therefore, the paper first focuses on benchmarking Top Tier firms with similar firms in 
other countries and moves second to a comparison of Top Tier versus Second Tier firms. Each 
exercise focuses on three main areas: (financial) performance, investment, and leverage.  
 
We find a  tendency by Egypt’s top tier of listed firms to finance themselves mainly from 
operating cash flows, trade credits, and other short-term borrowing which raises questions as to 
whether recent performance could have been even better had these firms done more in the way of 
long-term financing and long-term investment.  This issue is starker for large second tier of 
much-smaller firms. We also find some evidence that privatized enterprises have slightly poorer 
performance, but have higher leverage ratios. This finding points to potentially structural 
differences in access to finance and performance for former state-owned firms. 
 
Section 3 compares the Egyptian stock market against other stock markets by focusing on three 
main areas during 2003-08: market size, market activity, and the ability to raise capital. We find 
that the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) has experienced extraordinary market capitalization growth 
and is well above expected levels, fueled by strong price increases. The concentration of market 
capitalization is in line with similar countries and has been improving consistently.  
 
Market activity has been increasing and reached expected levels in 2006, but dropped in 2007. 
Turnover concentration has been improving consistently as well, despite a relatively unfavorable 
free float distribution, but had a setback in 2007/2008. The more stringent listing rules issued in 
2002 induced a strong delisting trend that has put the number of listed firms at expected levels. 
Despite strong improvement however, many companies remain completely illiquid. We estimate 
that transaction costs have come down and compare favorably to other countries. Commissions 
appear to represent the largest transaction cost component. 
 
In its ability to raise capital  relative to capital formation,  Egypt  seems to do well, but 
privatizations  and relatively low gross fixed capital formation might distort the picture. 
Regarding non-privatization public offering activity, SPO activity has been high as many closely 
held companies skip the IPO stage to do an SPO, but it comprises less than one percent of market 
capitalization. In addition, IPO activity has been both low and amounts to less than 0.5 percent of 
market capitalization. 
   4 
Some policy implications arise from this paper. In particular, additional reforms to raise EGX 
liquidity are worth considering. As some EGX-listed firms are still basically inactive, it makes 
sense to conduct ensure that EGX’s 2002 de-listing initiative is being effectively implemented 
and to consider additional measures to accelerate delisting of dormant or non-compliant 
securities. Given the importance of free float, EGX could consider raising the minimum public 




2  Financial Performance of Egyptian Firms 
 
There is a clear stratification among Egypt’s firms in terms of financial performance and access 
to finance. A top tier of 31 firms shows strong performance during 2003-2007 relative to peers in 
other emerging markets. These firms have been able to sustain rapid sales growth, apparently 
through heavy reliance on short-term trade credits, some short-term debt, and operating cash 
flows (retained earnings). There has been some real decline in net fixed assets – presumably 
reflecting productivity gains, actual disinvestment, or some combination thereof.  Additional 
reforms of Egypt’s equity market and institutional investor base may encourage a sustainable rise 
in stock market valuations, with resulting benefits for capital formation and economic growth. A 
larger second tier of 234  much-smaller, publicly-listed companies shows somewhat slower 
growth and lower profitability.  Their access to long-term financing seems notably more 
constrained, which diminishes their future prospects for capital investment and growth. 
 
Using the Worldscope Fundamentals database from Thomson Reuters, we first compare 31 Top 
Tier Egyptian companies with 948 similar companies from the following peer group of 11 
countries: Colombia, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Turkey (Exhibit 2.1). Because Egypt is a lower-middle income (LMI) country, 
we also compare the Top Tier with firms in the other LMI countries: Colombia, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Philippines. Given the focus  on firms in the real economy, Top Tier 
companies only partially overlap with the CASE 30 Index, Egypt’s main stock market index (see 
Exhibit A.1). Using data from Egyptian data provider Coface, in the second part we compare 234 
smaller Second Tier companies with the 31 Top Tier firms. 
 




Sector Peer group Total
Top tier Second tier
Construction and materials 178 8 48 234
Consumer staples 291 11 74 376
Industrial cyclical 409 9 81 499
Travel & leisure 70 3 31 104
Total 948 31 234 1,213
Note: Peer group consists of companies in Colombia, Chile, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, and Turkey.
Egypt  5 
2.1  Egypt’s Top Tier Firms vs. Global Peers 
 
Egypt’s 31 large firms have generally seen robust real growth. Median real annual sales growth 
for them was 9.8 percent for 2003-2007, versus 6 percent for the broad peer group and 3 percent 
for the narrower LMI peer group (Table A-2). It appears that Egypt’s top-tier firms have relied 
much more on trade credits, short-term bank borrowing, and retained earnings to finance 
ongoing business.  
 
While differences in industry composition could account for these disparities, a statistical 
analysis of all available firm information (including industry composition) generally confirms 
this pattern. Sales growth was especially strong in Egypt’s travel and leisure (T&L) sector (29 
percent annual growth), building materials and construction (BMC) (22 percent), and cyclical 
industrial (14 percent). Consumer staples, however, showed 5.4 percent annual real declines in 
sales. 
 
Typically, a Top Tier Egyptian company is large: it is roughly 6-7 times larger in terms of total 
assets and sales than the other 203 Egyptian firms. The Top Tier company group has eight firms 
in the Construction and Materials, 11 in the Consumer Staples, nine in the Industrial Cyclical, 
and three in the Travel and Leisure sectors. Exhibit  A.1 in the annex  list the individual 
companies.  
 
2.1.1  Performance: Consistently superior profitability across sectors, especially in Travel and 
Leisure, but with the exception of Consumer Staples 
Top Tier firms outperform both peer groups on all indicators during 2003-07. For example, with 
9.8 percent, median yearly real sales growth exceeds the peer group with 3.8 percentage points 
(pp), pointing to robust growth (Exhibit 2.2). Looking at other profitability indicators, we see 
that Egyptian firms also outperform the peer group top companies as reflected by the net 
operating margin (+8.7 pp), ROA (6.1 pp), and ROE (+14.4 pp). Unreported regression analysis 
indicates that this superior profitability is likely driven by lower total expenses, which is in part, 
but not fully explained by firm size (as low as 8-9  pp of sales, even after taking size into 
account). 
 
Exhibit 2.2 shows that only companies in the Consumer Staples sector exhibited negative sales 
growth, with 8.4 pp lower than the peer group. The opposite is true for the Industrial Cyclical, 
Construction and Materials, and Travel and Leisure sectors. In particular, sales growth in the 
Travel and Leisure sector is much higher than the peer group by as much as 27 pp., showing that 
tourism remains very strong.  
   6 
Exhibit 2.2 – Profitability indicators 
Medians and means for 2003-07 
 
Source: Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
Notes: Retained earnings to Equity from Coface also include Reserves. Whole peer group: Colombia, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, and Turkey. LMI countries:
 
 Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Philippines. 
The industry level analysis in Exhibit 2.3 echoes this finding and shows that across all sectors, all 
profitability measures have been enjoying healthy growth rates over the period 2003-07, relative 
to the peer group. Exhibit  2.3  also shows that although all sectors have much higher net 
profitability, it is especially high in the Travel and Leisure sector (+19.5 pp), although the 
margins have been shrinking fast with a CAGR of -11.9 percent. The consistently high ROA 
points to sustainable profitability which is not due to lower asset growth (Exhibit 2.1). The 
extremely high ROE further points to durable profitability, which for all sectors has been 
growing at a positive rate. Again, the Travel and Leisure sector exhibits superior profitability 
growth (CAGR 44.1 percent; Exhibit 2.3).  
 
The above findings could just represent high variation within industries and over the years. In 
addition, they do not take into account that countries have different industry compositions. 
Therefore we perform median regression analysis that explicitly accounts for these factors and 
corrects for differences in countries’ industries. In addition, this technique withstands noisy data, 
leading to more reliable results (see Box 1). 
 
Exhibit  2.4  shows the median Egyptian firm  had superior performance across the board 
compared to the median non-Egyptian firm in the LMI group, even after correcting for 
differences in industry composition between countries. For example, the median Egyptian firm 
enjoyed a 6.8 percent higher sales growth compared to the median LMI-firm. Moreover, Egypt’s 
outperformance for all indicators is statistically significant. Differences are slightly lower 
compared to the peer group and although sales growth is higher in Egypt it is no longer 
statistically significant from the peer group. However, the difference in the profitability 









     Median 6.0 9.3 5.2 7.7 0.9
     Mean 9.1 12.3 4.4 5.3 6.5
LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS)
     Median 3.0 8.8 4.3 5.7 -4.2
     Mean 5.6 12.6 3.9 4.3 0.2
Top Tier, Egypt (WS)
     Median 9.8 18.0 11.3 22.1 0.9
     Mean 14.1 20.3 13.4 23.9 6.1  7 
Exhibit 2.3 – Profitability Analysis by Industry 
Medians by year and average median and compounded average growth rate of period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
 
Box 1 – Median regressions: A robust technique to statistically assess country differences 
In the median regression models, we analyze all available firm information from all countries. The purpose is to 
estimate whether there are significant differences between Egyptian firms and firms in the benchmark group. In 
doing so, we estimate the coefficient of an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm is Egyptian and 0 
otherwise. The estimated coefficient on the indicator variable represents the difference between the typical Egyptian 
firm versus the typical non-Egyptian firm. This value is the reported value. To account for differences in industry 
composition for each country we add industry-fixed effects to the model. 
 
We use median regressions (a particular type of quantile regressions) because balance sheet and profit and loss data 
are noisy. Thus averages are misleading and medians are a better central tendency indicator. Therefore we don’t use 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The interpretation of the coefficients is similar, except the result of a median 
regression represents the expected value for a median firm, instead of the average firm as in OLS. 
 
Exhibit 2.4 – Statistical differences between the median Egyptian firm and the median 
benchmark group firm 
Quantile regressions for period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
Note: Differences are expressed in percentage points. Statistically different refers to a p-value less than 0.1. 
 
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Operating profit margin, %
     Peer group 13.9 12.0 13.9 -2.9 13.8 14.4 16.1 0.8
     Egypt - Top tier 53.0 28.1 33.4 -11.9 19.8 20.3 27.8 0.4
ROA, %
     Peer group 3.1 3.4 3.2 1.4 3.7 6.4 5.8 11.5
     Egypt - Top tier 4.5 9.5 8.8 16.1 9.5 10.7 14.7 2.3
ROE, %
     Peer group 2.9 4.4 3.5 9.2 4.9 10.5 10.1 16.4
     Egypt - Top tier 2.9 17.9 15.7 44.1 12.8 18.7 22.1 7.8
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Peer group NA NA 1.9 NA NA NA 10.7 NA
     Egypt - Top tier NA NA 28.9 NA NA NA 21.8 NA
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Operating profit margin, %
     Peer group 7.8 8.8 8.4 2.5 7.5 7.9 8.1 0.9
     Egypt - Top tier 9.1 4.0 5.8 -15.2 19.1 12.4 17.8 -8.3
ROA, %
     Peer group 5.6 6.3 5.4 2.2 4.5 5.7 5.3 5.1
     Egypt - Top tier 9.9 10.2 9.8 0.7 10.3 16.7 13.3 10.2
ROE, %
     Peer group 7.0 10.1 7.6 7.6 5.4 9.6 8.0 11.9
     Egypt - Top tier 18.4 24.8 21.0 6.1 19.8 24.8 23.3 4.6
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Peer group NA NA 3.0 NA NA NA 8.8 NA
     Egypt - Top tier NA NA -5.4 NA NA NA 14.0 NA
Travel and leisure Construction and materials






Real sales growth, % 6.8 Yes 3.4 No
Op. profit margin, % 8.4 Yes 7.5 Yes
ROA, % 6.9 Yes 6.3 Yes
ROE, % 15.8 Yes 14.6 Yes
Real asset growth, % 5.2 Yes -0.9 No
Median difference with peer 
group, (pp)
Median difference with LMI 
countries, (pp)  8 
2.1.2  Investment: Higher profits are not always reinvested, with Consumer Staples disinvesting 
and Travel and Leisure fixed assets growing strong 
Firms reinvest their profits and raise new money because of asset depreciation and to anticipate 
growth opportunities. Indeed, despite superior profitability, with a median of 17.3 percent, 
retained earnings to equity of Egyptian firms are similar to the peer group (Exhibit  2.5). 
However, Egyptian net fixed asset growth is not clearly higher than the peer group. Together 
with superior price to book ratios, this suggests a mixed picture on the sector level. 
 
Exhibit 2.5 – Investment indicators 
Medians and means for 2003-07 
 
Source: Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
Notes: Whole peer group: Colombia, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, and 
Turkey. LMI countries:
 
 Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, and Philippines. 
There are indeed differences on the industry level. Consistent with its lower profitability, 
Consumer Staples shows significantly lower retained earnings in 2007 (-20.9 pp; Exhibit 2.6). In 
addition, its fixed asset growth in 2007 is much lower than the peer group (-2.9 pp). Not 
coincidentally, the price book ratio is only lower for Consumer Staples. In contrast, with higher 
fixed asset growth and lower retained earnings, the Travel and Leisure sector seems to be 
reinvesting its profits significantly, consistent with its superior price to book ratio (+5.9 pp). 
Although fixed asset growth rates of the Industrial Cyclical and Construction and Materials 
sectors are slightly higher, with significantly higher retained earnings, they seem to be hoarding 
their profits. 
 
Exhibit 2.7 shows the statistical differences of indicators between Egypt and the benchmark 
groups where we have corrected for differences in industry composition. Relative to the LMI 
group, Egypt has superior net fixed asset growth of 2.9 pp, indicating that the typical Egyptian 
firm invests more than is expected based on its income bracket. However, comparing to the peer 
group, the difference is negative and not statistically significant likely due to industry variation. 
The slightly lower retained earnings in combination with robust high profitability suggest that 
the median Egyptian firm is reinvesting its earnings. However, the significantly higher Egyptian 
price to book ratio implies that investment is relatively on the low side. 
 
Net fixed asset 





     Median -3.9 1.3 17.7
     Mean 1.2 1.7 18.4
LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS)
     Median -8.6 1.1 19.3
     Mean -5.8 1.5 20.7
Top Tier, Egypt (WS)
     Median -5.3 1.8 17.3
     Mean 3.2 2.3 18.5  9 
Exhibit 2.6 – Investment indicators by industry, 2007 
Medians 
 
Source: Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
 
Exhibit 2.7 – Statistical differences between the median Egyptian firm and the median 
benchmark group firm 
Quantile regressions for period 2003-2007 
 
Note: Differences are expressed in percentage points. Statistically different refers to a p-value less than 0.1. 
 
2.1.3  Leverage: Higher debt levels with an emphasis on short term liabilities and a reliance on 
trade credit 
Firms can finance their activities in several ways. The research literature suggests that companies 
can raise money easier in more developed markets. In that respect, Egyptian firms are doing 
particularly well. Exhibit 2.8  shows that relative to both the LMI group and the peer group, they 
exhibit significantly higher debt to equity levels (+9.5 pp). In addition, a superior total liabilities 
to equity level (+31.3 pp) further indicates Egyptian firms use either more trade credit and/or 
obtain funds from other creditors. To finance their activities Egyptian firms seem to rely much 
more on short term liabilities (+ 9 pp), which confirms that trade finance is important. Lastly, 
relative to the peer group, because of the high profitability, Egyptian firms are in a good position 
to take on more debt, as evidenced by a higher interest coverage ratio. 
 
On the sector level, we observe higher debt to equity ratios for all sectors except for Consumer 
Staples which has also been deleveraging with 8.6 percent per year (Exhibit 2.9). Deleveraging 
has also been taking place in Industrial Cyclical, but it still carries more total debt. The 
importance of trade finance for all sectors is again confirmed by higher total liabilities to equity 
level across the board. Higher short term debt levels for all sectors (except Consumer Staples) 
points to the relative importance of shorter maturities in Egypt. Interestingly, Industrial Cyclical 
seem to have been substituting long term debt for short term debt, whereas Travel and Leisure is 









Yearly net fixed asset growth, %
     Peer group -3.6 -4.6 -3.4 -4.5
     Egypt - Top tier 12.5 -2.7 -6.3 -3.2
Retained earnings to Equity, %
     Peer group 19.6 17.2 23.0 14.7
     Egypt - Top tier 1.2 28.4 2.1 22.2
Price to book ratio
     Peer group 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.6






Net fixed asset growth, % 2.9 Yes -1.7 No
Price/Book Value Ratio 0.8 Yes 0.5 Yes
Retained Earnings to Equity, % -3.2 No -0.4 No
Median difference with peer 
group, (pp)
Median difference with LMI 
countries, (pp)  10 
 
Exhibit 2.8 – Leverage indicators 
 
Source: Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
 
Exhibit 2.10 shows statistical differences of indicators between Egypt and benchmark groups, 
adjusted for differences in industry composition of countries. Clearly, relative to the LMI group, 
the typical Egyptian firm has a 11.8 pp higher debt to equity ratio. It is still 7.3 pp higher 
compared to the peer group, but no longer statistically significant. The even higher total 
liabilities level, combined with a statistical significantly higher short term debt level, support the 
earlier finding of emphasis on short term maturities. Moreover, the significantly higher current 
liabilities level implies a strong reliance on trade finance. 
 
Exhibit 2.9 – Leverage analysis by industry 
Medians by year and average median and compounded average growth rate of period 2003-2007 
 











EBIT / Total 
Interest 
Expense Ratio
Whole peer group (WS)
     Median 69.6 22.2 58.5 3.0
     Mean 65.1 36.4 64.7 279.4
LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS)
     Median 69.6 19.9 55.3 2.4
     Mean 64.4 35.6 58.8 458.8
Top Tier, Egypt (WS)
     Median 78.6 31.7 89.8 5.3
     Mean 74.2 45.0 93.5 85.6
Travel and leisure Construction and materials
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group 50.9 55.8 53.5 1.9 57.8 53.2 59.4 -1.7
     Egypt - Top tier 61.0 61.9 66.9 0.3 53.6 66.7 58.9 4.5
Total debt to Equity, %
     Peer group 24.1 17.2 16.6 -6.6 14.3 27.5 21.5 14.0
     Egypt - Top tier 74.5 44.3 59.1 -9.9 52.2 61.8 46.4 3.5
Total liabilities to Equity, %
     Peer group 45.6 53.6 46.9 3.3 44.9 55.9 52.7 4.5
     Egypt - Top tier 106.0 86.8 109.5 -3.9 81.5 89.3 76.1 1.8
Short term liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group 14.3 15.6 15.2 1.8 16.3 14.6 15.8 -2.1
     Egypt - Top tier 18.4 24.3 19.7 5.7 20.1 30.9 19.5 9.0
Consumer staples Industrial cyclical
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group 71.7 69.0 70.1 -0.8 72.8 75.9 75.0 0.9
     Egypt - Top tier 86.4 96.8 94.5 2.3 76.6 84.1 77.2 1.9
Total debt to Equity, %
     Peer group 29.9 30.4 30.7 0.3 18.7 19.3 18.8 0.6
     Egypt - Top tier 32.4 20.7 21.0 -8.6 30.6 16.3 42.7 -11.8
Total liabilities to Equity, %
     Peer group 66.8 64.9 64.3 -0.6 58.1 57.0 59.5 -0.4
     Egypt - Top tier 83.5 112.9 101.1 6.2 58.4 78.1 82.4 6.0
Short term liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group 90.8 96.0 94.5 1.1 20.7 17.2 19.3 -3.6
     Egypt - Top tier 58.4 60.0 61.0 0.5 22.2 50.6 32.3 17.9  11 
Exhibit 2.10 – Statistical differences between the median Egyptian firm and the median 
benchmark group firm 
Quantile regressions for period 2003-2007 
 
Note: Differences are expressed in percentage points. Statistically different refers to a p-value less than 0.1. 
 
2.2  Second Tier Firms vs. Top Tier Firms in Egypt 
 
After benchmarking Egypt’s Top Tier firms, we next contrast differences between Top and 
Second Tier firms.  
 
2.2.1  Performance: Top Tier firms mostly outperform Second Tier firms, but Second Tier firms 
still likely outperform top companies in other LMI countries 
Across all profitability indicators, Top Tier firms clearly show superior performance relative to 
Second Tier firms. Looking at medians, Exhibit 2.11 shows a lower real yearly sales growth of 
3.6 pp, a lower operating profit margin of 5.1 pp, a lower ROA of 2.9 pp, and a lower ROE of 
5.6 pp. Unreported regression analysis shows this results is driven by lower COGS and total 
expenses for Top Tier firms which can fully be explained by the fact that Top Tier firms are 
larger and hence enjoy significant scale economies (-7.0 pp and 1.5 pp, respectively). 
 
In fact, Second Tier firms even seem to outperform top firms in countries with a similar level of 
economic development: the LMI group. However, the Worldscope and Coface are not 
completely comparable, which is likely due to errors and differences in definitions. The Coface 
database slightly underestimates the operating margin, ROA and ROE of Top Tier firms. 
Therefore, assuming that differences between databases of Top Tier companies translate to the 
other companies, Second Tier firms also outperform the LMI group. Because the Coface values 
are on average between 80 to 95 percent of the Worldscope data, it is very unlikely that the 







Total debt to Equity, % 11.8 Yes 7.3 No
Total liabilities to Equity, % 29.8 Yes 30.3 Yes
Current to Total Liabilities, % 9.4 Yes 10.1 Yes
ST debt to total liabilities, % 3.1 No 4.0 Yes
EBIT / Total Interest Expense Ratio 2.9 Yes 2.2 Yes
Median difference with peer 
group, (pp)
Median difference with LMI 
countries, (pp)  12 
Exhibit 2.11 – Profitability indicators 
Medians and means for 2003-07 
 
Source: Coface Egypt;Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
 
As regards industry differences, Exhibit 2.12 shows that in all sector performance indicators 
have been growing strongly over the period 2003-07, with the exception of the ROE and sales 
growth of Top Tier Consumer Staples firms, which confirms earlier findings. Both in 
Construction and Materials and industrial Cyclical, Top Tier firms outperform Second Tier firms 
unambiguously. However, in Travel and Leisure, Second Tier firms seem to outperform Top Tier 
firms in terms of margins and ROA. However, Top Tier firms have been showing superior 
growth rates, indicating that they are catching up rapidly.  
 
After taking into account factors that can bias the results, we confirm that the median Top Tier 
firm shows significant outperformance. In doing so, we conduct a median regression analysis to 
assert that the findings not simply reflect sectors differences between Top and Second Tier firms 
or the economic cycle. The first two columns of Exhibit 2.12 nonetheless clearly show that Top 
Tier firms show superior results in terms of margins, ROA, and ROE. Top Tier firms outperform 
Second Tier firms by 4.9 pp, 3.7 pp, 5.3 pp, respectively. Still, there is no longer a significant 
difference in sales growth. These findings are very similar to the earlier simple median analysis. 
However, because Top Tier firms are 6 to 7 times larger, the last two columns of Exhibit 2.13 
also take into account whether a company is small, medium, or large. However, even after this 
correction, Top Tier firms show higher profitability, implying that firm size does not fully 










     Median 3.4 9.9 6.4 12.6 -1.3
     Mean 7.5 17.2 8.0 15.1 3.6
Top Tier
     Median 7.0 15.0 9.3 19.2 0.0
     Mean 13.8 18.9 10.1 19.9 5.0
Peer group (WS)
     Median 6.0 9.3 5.2 7.7 0.9
     Mean 9.1 12.3 4.4 5.3 6.5
LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS)
     Median 3.0 8.8 4.3 5.7 -4.2
     Mean 5.6 12.6 3.9 4.3 0.2  13 
Exhibit 2.12 – Profitability analysis by industry 
Medians by year and average median and compounded average growth rate of period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Coface Egypt; World Bank staff analysis 
 
Exhibit 2.13 – Statistical differences between the median Top Tier firm and the median 
Second Tier firm 
Quantile regressions for period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Coface Egypt; World Bank staff analysis 
Note: Differences are expressed in percentage points. Statistically different refers to a p-value less than 0.1. 
 
2.2.2  Investment: All tiers show similar signs of disinvestment with much higher retained 
earnings levels for Top Tier firms 
Exhibit  2.14  shows  that  both  tiers  experienced  significant  disinvestment―similar  to  the 
international  benchmark  results―which  was  even  higher  for  Second  Tier  firms  (median 
difference: -1.2 pp). Consistent with higher profitability, the Top Tier also shows higher retained 
earnings. However, international comparison is difficult since Coface information overstates 
fixed asset growth and retained earnings significantly,  but the big differences both point to 
significant underinvestment and hoarding of earnings. 
 
Construction and materials, medians
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Operating profit margin, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 40.4 47.6 44.0 3.3 8.9 13.5 10.2 8.7
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 10.1 22.4 21.2 17.3 15.1 26.2 23.4 11.6
ROA, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 4.8 9.0 6.9 13.5 4.1 9.5 6.1 18.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 1.4 7.0 5.2 39.0 6.3 14.4 11.6 17.9
ROE, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 7.1 14.6 10.4 15.6 10.6 24.2 16.2 18.0
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 3.8 12.1 10.7 26.3 8.8 22.6 19.7 20.6
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA 10.3 8.1 NA NA 2.9 5.3 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 20.8 17.1 NA NA 2.5 11.8 NA
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Operating profit margin, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 6.5 7.3 7.0 2.3 8.1 10.7 9.9 5.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 5.0 6.8 6.2 6.4 18.3 22.2 19.5 3.9
ROA, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 5.6 6.2 5.7 1.9 5.1 8.9 7.0 11.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 8.7 8.8 9.1 0.1 5.0 12.1 10.4 19.6
ROE, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 11.6 12.3 13.4 1.2 10.2 18.4 14.2 12.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 21.6 16.7 20.1 -5.0 15.1 26.0 22.3 11.5
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -0.7 -0.9 NA NA 6.9 6.2 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -3.6 -3.7 NA NA 17.8 9.9 NA
Travel and leisure, medians






Real sales growth, % 2.6 No 0.5 No
Op. profit margin, % 4.9 Yes 1.8 Yes
ROA, % 3.7 Yes 4.4 Yes
ROE, % 5.3 Yes 6.1 Yes
Real asset growth, % 1.0 No -0.7 No
Median difference, (pp)
Median difference also taking 
firm size into account, (pp)  14 
Exhibit 2.14 – Investment indicators 
Medians and means for 2003-07 
 
Source: Coface Egypt;Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
Notes: Retained earnings to Equity from Coface also include Reserves. Whole peer group: Colombia, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, and Turkey. LMI countries:
 
 Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Philippines. 
Regarding differences between industries, Exhibit 2.15 clearly shows that all tiers and industries 
have significant negative asset growth, with the exception of Top Tier Travel and Leisure 
companies, which has been growing rapidly as we found earlier. Exhibit 2.15 also shows that 
tiers in all sectors have been enjoying strong retained earnings growth, with Top Tiers having 
superior earning levels, up to more than 20 pp in the Construction and Materials and Industrial 
Cyclical sectors. Again, Top Tier Travel and Leisure shows strong growth with a CAGR of 49.3 
percent.  
 
Exhibit 2.15 – Investment analysis by industry 
Medians by year and average median and compounded average growth rate of period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Coface Egypt; World Bank staff analysis 
 
The fixed asset growth difference between tiers discussed earlier is 1.1 pp higher, even after 
taking into account sector characteristics, as Exhibit 2.16 shows. However, this difference is not 
statistically significant and decreases even further to a gap of 0.2 pp once the company size has 
been accounted for. The retained earnings gap however is real with 15.7 pp and cannot be 






     Median -9.4 32.6
     Mean -3.4 34.1
Top Tier
     Median -8.2 48.1
     Mean -2.2 43.1
Peer group (WS)
     Median -3.9 17.7
     Mean 1.2 18.4
LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS)
     Median -8.6 19.3
     Mean -5.8 20.7
Travel and leisure, medians Construction and materials, medians
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Yearly net fixed asset growth, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -9.6 -9.2 NA NA -7.0 -8.8 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 17.4 14.9 NA NA -10.5 -10.6 NA
Retained earnings to Equity, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 18.3 31.2 28.0 11.2 42.3 46.0 38.4 1.7
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 6.6 49.3 37.8 49.3 59.8 70.7 59.5 3.4
Consumer staples, medians Industrial cyclical, medians
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Yearly net fixed asset growth, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -9.7 -9.0 NA NA -10.8 -10.4 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -3.7 -4.9 NA NA -8.6 -10.8 NA
Retained earnings to Equity, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 31.1 34.4 32.9 2.1 26.4 36.3 31.6 6.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 37.1 50.9 41.0 6.5 37.1 63.7 50.4 11.4  15 
explained by sector nor size characteristics. Again, this finding points to significant 
underinvestment and hoarding of earnings by Top Tier firms. 
 
Exhibit 2.16 – Statistical differences between the median Top Tier firm and the median 
Second Tier firm 
Quantile regressions for period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Coface Egypt; World Bank staff analysis 
Note: Differences are expressed in percentage points. Statistically different refers to a p-value less than 0.1. 
 
2.2.3  Leverage: Deleveraging is taking place in all firms, although Top Tier firms have higher 
total debt levels; Second Tier firms have similar total debt as firms in the LMI group, but 
are more reliant on shorter maturities 
Top Tier firms have both higher total debt and total liabilities levels than the Second Tier (14.7 
pp and 24.4 pp, respectively), as Exhibit 2.16 shows. Second Tier firms also clearly have less 
access to long term finance as short term debt as a portion of total liabilities is 6.3 pp higher. The 
disproportionately higher level of current liabilities of Second Tier firms further suggests that 
Second Tier firms rely much more on trade credit, potentially a result from worse access to 
finance conditions. This suggestion is further supported by the fact that paid-in capital is much 
higher for the Second Tier (9.7 pp).  
 
An international comparison is possible, since Coface and Worldscope leverage data are very 
close.  Exhibit  2.17  shows that the Second Tier is leveraged in line with top firms in LMI 
countries, as evidenced by only a slightly higher debt level (0.5 pp). Total liabilities levels are 
with 63.5 percent both higher than the peer group and the LMI group. In combination with 
higher current liabilities and short term debt, this confirms that Second Tier firms rely relatively 
more on short term maturities and trade finance. The differences in profitability clearly reflect 
that the interest coverage ratio is higher in Egypt, despite debt levels also being higher. 
 
As for industry differences, Top Tier firms have higher total debt levels in all sectors, except for 
Consumer Staples (Exhibit 2.18). In addition, all sectors have been showing strong deleveraging 
over the period 2003-07, with the exception of the Top Tier in Industrial Cyclical (CAGR 23.2 
percent). This finding is further supported by the strong growth in interest coverage across the 
board. In addition, we observe an overall increase in current liabilities for all tiers. However, for 
all Second Tier firms, short term debt decreased, except for Construction and Materials, showing 
the increasing importance of different credit sources like trade finance. In contrast, short term 







Net fixed asset growth, % 1.1 No 0.2 No
Retained Earnings to Equity, % 15.7 Yes 15.5 Yes
Median difference, (pp)
Median difference also taking 
firm size into account, (pp)  16 
Exhibit 2.17 – Leverage indicators 
Medians and means for 2003-07 
 
Source: Coface Egypt;Worldscope; World Bank staff analysis 
Notes: Retained earnings to Equity from Coface also include Reserves. Whole peer group: Colombia, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, and Turkey. LMI countries:
 
 Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Philippines. 
Exhibit 2.18 – Leverage analysis by industry 
Medians by year and average median and compounded average growth rate of period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Coface Egypt; World Bank staff analysis 
 
Exhibit 2.19 shows that the difference in debt levels between the tiers is driven by size: after 
correcting for industry debt characteristics and the business cycle, the median Top Tier firms has 














debt to tot. 
liabilities (%)
Paid in capital 
to total assets, 
(%)
Second Tier
     Median 86.1 19.4 63.5 3.3 25.4 34.3
     Mean 76.0 35.2 73.5 381.6 29.1 36.7
Top Tier
     Median 78.4 34.1 87.9 3.9 19.1 24.6
     Mean 74.1 43.6 94.3 59.1 24.0 26.8
Peer group (WS)
     Median 69.6 22.2 58.5 3.0 14.9 NA
     Mean 65.1 36.4 64.7 279.4 21.4 NA
LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS)
     Median 69.6 19.9 55.3 2.4 16.0 NA
     Mean 64.4 35.6 58.8 458.8 23.9 NA
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 49.1 79.0 58.7 10.0 75.2 88.2 84.3 3.2
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 60.0 69.7 72.3 3.0 53.8 70.7 57.0 5.6
Total debt to Equity, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 4.2 4.1 6.0 -0.6 26.1 24.6 31.2 -1.2
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 119.4 32.6 57.8 -22.9 53.1 29.5 44.0 -11.1
Total liabilities to Equity, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 19.2 26.9 29.8 6.9 87.6 65.7 84.8 -5.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 181.9 72.2 111.2 -16.9 55.7 49.5 60.9 -2.3
EBIT to interest expenses
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 4.0 18.3 8.6 35.3 1.1 3.6 2.9 25.8
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 0.6 8.1 3.0 69.8 2.2 8.2 4.5 30.8
Short term debt to tot. liabilities, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 9.6 8.8 8.6 -1.6 23.3 32.4 26.4 6.8
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 26.1 0.1 7.9 -65.9 4.3 16.3 6.6 30.8
2003 2007 Average CAGR 2003 2007 Average CAGR
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 89.2 90.0 86.2 0.2 85.9 88.7 86.7 0.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 89.3 91.9 94.4 0.6 37.1 75.6 60.8 15.3
Total debt to Equity, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 28.1 20.7 24.2 -6.0 21.1 19.8 18.0 -1.3
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 28.9 16.2 22.9 -10.9 31.0 87.9 56.6 23.2
Total liabilities to Equity, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 58.4 60.0 61.0 0.5 65.4 65.9 66.4 0.2
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 138.7 84.1 104.0 -9.5 75.1 150.5 101.8 14.9
EBIT to interest expenses
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 2.5 2.9 3.3 2.4 1.9 4.2 3.7 17.7
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 3.1 3.8 4.2 4.6 1.3 4.3 3.3 26.9
Short term debt to tot. liabilities, %
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 66.8 64.9 64.3 -0.6 28.8 22.2 26.5 -5.1
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 12.2 24.1 18.1 14.6 15.5 35.6 25.0 18.1
Travel and leisure, medians Construction and materials, medians
Consumer staples, medians Industrial cyclical, medians  17 
taken into account, this gaps drops to -3.9 pp and is no longer statistically significant. This 
finding is supported by the fact that Top Tier firms have significantly lower paid-in capital, 
which can not be completely explained by their size. Similarly, Top Tier firms are much less 
reliant on short term debt because they are larger.  
 
Exhibit 2.19 – Statistical differences between the median Top Tier firm and the median 
Second Tier firm 
Quantile regressions for period 2003-2007 
 
Source: Coface Egypt; World Bank staff analysis 
Note: Differences are expressed in percentage points. Statistically different refers to a p-value less than 0.1. 
 
2.2.4  Financing patterns: Reliance on trade credit, short-term credit, and retained earnings 
Exhibit 2.20 suggests that top-tier firms rely much more on other creditors (i.e. trade credits), 
short-term bank borrowing, and retained earnings as sources of finance. Median growth of 9.6 
percent in other creditors and 15.2 percent in retained earnings are high compared to similar 
firms in the peer groups. Top-tier firms also experienced a smaller contraction in short-term debt 
and a larger contraction in long-term debt during the period. Issuance of equity (i.e., paid-in 
capital) by Egypt’s top-tier firms did not keep pace with inflation. Reliance on other creditors 
and short-term borrowing, may have led to higher financing costs. 
 
Exhibit 2.20 shows that second-tier firms seem generally more constrained in terms of financing 
growth. Compared with the typical top-tier firm, the typical second-tier firm exhibited decreases 
in trade credits and lower growth in retained earnings during 2003-07. The relatively poor ability 







Total debt to Equity, % 8.7 Yes -3.9 No
Total liabilities to Equity, % 24.0 Yes 6.6 No
Current to Total Liabilities, % -3.9 No 5.3 Yes
ST debt to Total Liabilities, % -5.7 Yes 0.2 No
EBIT / Total Interest Expense Ratio 0.3 No 0.5 No
Paid-in capital to total assets, % -11.5 Yes -7.8 Yes
Median difference, (pp)
Median difference also taking 
firm size into account, (pp)  18 
Exhibit 2.20: Growth rates of several financing sources 
 
 
2.3  Performance of Privatized SOEs vs. Their Peers 
 
Since June 1994, 52 SOEs have been privatized via public offerings in Egypt. Of these, 30 
former SOE are in the real sector. We compared these companies with non-privatized companies 
to understand whether former SOEs have significantly different characteristics in terms of 
profitability and leverage. We find that former SOEs have somewhat poorer performance, but 
higher leverage. These findings could suggest a lack of competitiveness of former SOEs and 
potentially preferential access to external finance. Exhibit 2.21 shows that most of the former 
SOEs can be found in the consumer staples industry. The largest privatization wave occurred in 
1996. 
 
Medians 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average
Real yearly long term debt growth, %
     Peer group (WS) -11.2 -11.0 -11.8 -11.3
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) -21.3 -16.4 -16.1 -13.8 -16.9
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) -15.6 -19.2 -35.7 -23.5
     LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS) -15.0 -20.6 -20.0 -18.5
Real yearly short term debt growth, %
     Peer group (WS) -2.0 -5.9 -2.0 -3.3
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) -5.1 -6.5 -1.1 -7.4 -5.0
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) -5.9 -4.2 3.4 -2.2
     LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS) 0.5 -6.6 -9.2 -5.1
Real yearly paid-in capital growth, %
     Peer group (WS) -1.0 -5.6 -5.9 -4.1
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) -9.8 -4.7 -7.2 -8.6 -7.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) -9.0 -3.0 -4.3 -5.4
     LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS) -5.6 -8.7 -10.5 -8.3
Real yearly retained earnings growth, %
     Peer group (WS) 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.8
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 1.9 9.8 6.4 7.9 6.5
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) -2.6 37.6 10.6 15.2
     LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS) 2.6 -3.6 -2.2 -1.1
Real yearly other creditors growth, %
     Peer group (WS) 7.8 3.4 2.8 4.6
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 0.7 -2.7 -2.2 -2.2 -1.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 4.3 13.3 11.4 9.6
     LMI countries, excl. Egypt (WS) 3.4 -0.2 -2.6 0.2
Note: Peer group consists of companies in Colombia, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, and Turkey.
LMI countries are Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, and Philippines.  19 
Exhibit 2.21: Composition former SOEs 
By sector            By year 
 
          
Source: Coface; World Bank staff analysis 
 
Exhibit 2.22 compares simple medians and shows that ROE and ROA are similar for former 
SOEs and private companies. A standard test shows that the differences are not statistically 
different. In contrast, with 6 pp., real annual sales growth of former SOEs is significantly lower. 
In addition, there is some statistical evidence that the operating margin of former SOEs is more 
than 2 pp lower. Retained earnings and EBIT to interest expenses are slightly higher for former 
SOEs, but not significantly so. There does not seem to be a difference in the total debt to 
common equity level. However, looking at other leverage indicators, current to total liabilities 
and total liabilities to equity are significantly higher for former SOEs (6.2 pp and 29.7 pp, 
respectively). On the other hand, paid-in capital is significantly lower (6 pp). This result implies 
that former SOEs are better able to gain access to (trade) financing, potentially because they are 
perceived to be stable or can rely on some form of government support. 
 
Exhibit 2.22: Profitability and leverage, 2003-07 
Medians, by type of firm 











         
  Private firms  14.7  7.9  7.4  11.4 
  Former SOEs  16.2  6.8  1.4  9.1 
 
 
Source: Coface; World Bank staff analysis 
 
Since most privatizations occurred in the consumer staples industry, the comparison could be 
influenced by industry particulars. Moreover, former SOEs could structurally differ in terms of 
size, biasing the comparison further. Therefore, we again compare profitability and leverage 
indicators over the period 2003-07, taking into account differences in type of industry and total 
assets. The findings in Exhibit 2.23 roughly confirm the differences highlighted in Exhibit 2.22: 
real sales growth is lower and current liabilities are higher.  
 
In a parallel exercise, we analyzed the time since the privatization and its power to explain the 
above-mentioned differences. We find that there is statistical evidence that the longer ago the 
Sector Number















EBIT to interest 
expenses, x
Total debt to 
common equity, 
%




Paid-in to total 
capital, %
   Private 33.5 4.4 27.7 84.1 74.5 36.1
   Former SOE 37.0 6.0 27.1 90.3 104.2 30.1  20 
privatization took place, the bigger the sales growth and current liabilities gap currently is. This 
result implies that instead of becoming more similar to other private companies, former SOEs 
seem to have followed a different path after privatization. 
 
Exhibit 2.23: Statistical differences between former SOEs vs. non-SOEs 




Source: Coface; World Bank staff analysis 
Note: This table is the result of company-level median regression analyses of 234 Egyptian companies where differences in 









Difference vs. private 0.3 -1.0 -7.8 0.3




EBIT to interest 
expenses, x
Total debt to 
common equity, 
%




Paid-in to total 
capital, %
Difference vs. private -3.8 1.8 -9.2 11.1 11.0 -2.0
Statistical difference? No No No Yes No No  21 
3  Performance of the Egyptian Exchange 
Like other markets around the world, Egypt’s stock market has suffered from the current 
financial crisis. In only five months, the CASE 30 Index fell more than 50 percent to below 
4,000 points from its all-time high point of 11,936 on May 5
th, 2008. The analysis however will 




3.1  Market Capitalization 
3.1.1  Market capitalization: Egypt experienced extraordinary market capitalization growth, 
fueled by strong price increases 
As the CASE 30 Index exhibited exceptional growth since early 2002 until May 2008 (by a 
factor 24), so did stock market capitalization (albeit with a 2006 correction). Exhibit 3.1 shows 
that with an average yearly growth rate of around 27 percent, Egypt’s capitalization as a fraction 
of GDP reached 107 percent in 2007, leaving other countries with similar income levels such as 
Philippines, Colombia, and Peru behind. 
 
Exhibit 3.1 – Stock market capitalization 
% of GDP for selected emerging markets, 2003-07 (left graph) 
% of GDP for Egypt actual versus benchmarked values, 1990-2007 (right graph) 
 
Source: EGX, S&P, World Federation of Exchanges, World Development Indicators; World Bank staff analysis 
Note for right graph: Benchmarked values based on a worldwide regression model that takes into account GDP per capita, 
population size and density, value of fuel exports to GDP, the poverty gap, and whether the country is an offshore financial 
center. The confidence interval is plus and minus the standard error of the prediction. 
 
Statistical analysis of worldwide data show there is a relationship between market capitalization, 
GDP per capita, population size and density, a country’s status as a fuel producer, and whether 
the country is an offshore financial center. Indeed,  Exhibit  3.1 shows benchmarking Egypt 
against these findings, market capitalization surged after 2002 well above expected levels. The 
main drivers of this  stock market boom seem to be stock market regulatory reform, strong 
economic growth, and growing net portfolio equity inflows that reached $1.8 billion during the 
market’s stellar performance of  2005, the  year  that Egypt joined the World Federation of 
                                                 























































































































































































































































































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
%  22 
Exchanges. However, there is some evidence that from 2005 onwards, continued capitalization 




3.1.2  Market concentration: In line with similar countries and has been improving consistently 
In 2007, market capitalization of the ten largest companies on the New York Stock Exchange 
was 19.3 of total capitalization. However, typically, in less developed markets this percentage is 
much higher. Exhibit  3.2 shows that the number in Egypt  is  roughly  50 percent,  which  is 
somewhat better than countries such as Argentina, Colombia, and Hungary and seems relatively 
stable over time. Next, we look in more detail at stocks covered in Bloomberg. Comparing the 




, Egypt does well: 30-40 companies capture 80 percent of market capitalization. In 
contrast, in Manama, less than ten companies capture 80 percent of market capitalization. This is 
true for 10-20 companies in Abu Dhabi, Casablanca, Muscat, and Qatar. In addition, Egypt’s 
distribution has been improving consistently. According to Bloomberg data, in 2005, the ten 
largest companies comprised 70 percent of capitalization which―similar to the WFE number of 
45 percent―dropped to 50 percent in 2008. 
Exhibit 3.2 – Concentration of market capitalization  
Capitalization of top ten largest companies as % of total capitalization, 2004-07 (upper graph) 
Capitalization of top 100 largest firms as % of total capitalization for selected countries, 2008 (left lower graph) 
Capitalization of top 100 largest firms as % of total capitalization in Egypt, 2005-08 (right lower graph) 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges, Bloomberg; World Bank staff analysis 
Note for lower graphs: 2008 information is up to and including June 20
th. 
 
                                                 
3 Billmeier and Massa (2007). “Go long or short in pyramids? News from the Egyptian stock market.” IMF working paper 179. 
4 Exhibit A1 in Annex 1 shows the MSCI investible indices for Egypt and the seven countries in the benchmark group. Exhibit 
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Cumulative fraction of 
Total market capitalization, %
Firms, 
from large 
to small  23 
3.2  Market Activity 
3.2.1  Aggregate trading activity: The turnover ratio and real value traded have been 
increasing and reached expected levels in 2006, but dropped in 2007 
Like capitalization, value traded exhibited strong growth, resulting in a substantial increase of 
the stock market turnover ratio, which in 2007 stood at 47 percent, despite a decrease since 2006 
(Exhibit 3.3). This places Egypt well ahead of some emerging countries such as Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia and Morocco. Egypt’s turnover ratio seems to have been catching up since 2001 
and in 2006 reached a level that is in line with expectations once country characteristics are 
accounted for. The 2006  drop seems to have affected both the most active and least active 
companies alike: the turnover ratio of the 50 most active companies as a percentage of their 
market capitalization was 45.5 percent in 2007. This is still higher than other lower-middle 
income countries, but slightly lower than Jordan’s.  
 
Exhibit 3.3 – Stock market turnover ratio and free float 
% of GDP for selected countries, 2003-07 (upper left graph) 
% of GDP for Egypt actual versus benchmarked values, 1990-07 (upper right graph) 
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%  24 
 
Source: EGX, S&P, World Federation of Exchanges, World Development Indicators, Coface; World Bank staff analysis 
Note for upper right graph: Benchmarked values based on a worldwide regression model that takes into account GDP per 
capita, population size and density, value of fuel exports to GDP, the poverty gap, and whether the country is an offshore 
financial center. The confidence interval is plus and minus the standard error of the prediction. Note for lower graph: The graph 
displays the latest available data and ranges from 2005 to 2008, but is mostly from the period 2006-2008. 
 
The free float is the fraction of shares that is available for trading to a broad audience. Exhibit 
3.3 shows that the free float on EGX is limited. More than 30 percent of companies have a free 
float of less than 5 percent. More than 50 percent of companies have a free float of less than 15 
percent. Only 5 percent of firms have a free float of 70 percent or higher. Low levels of free float 
adversely impact market activity and impede price discovery, while magnifying the market 
impact of a transaction and hence transaction costs, which further discourages trading. CMA 
however recently reduced the free float requirement for listed firms from 30 percent to 5 percent. 
It would be advisable to reconsider increasing this requirement and encourage listed firms to sell 
additional shares to the market. 
 
Looking at all Egyptian firms reported in Bloomberg―about 200 stocks in 2008―real average 
value traded was 10.6 times larger in 2007 than in 2003 (Exhibit 3.4). Driven by growing stock 
prices, volume traded grew strongly as well during this period (correlation coefficient is 0.75), 
but the increase in 2004 was entirely due to price increases as the number of transactions stayed 
roughly constant. Volume traded has been falling since February 2008, probably mainly due to 
international financial deterioration and receding capital flows. 
 
Exhibit 3.4 – Drivers of average real value traded 
Prices and number of transactions are indexed to base year 2003, 2003-07 (left graph) 







0 to 5  90  32.4% 
6 to 10  37  13.3% 
11 to 15  22  7.9% 
16 to 20  20  7.2% 
21 to 25  23  8.3% 
26 to 30  12  4.3% 
31 to 35  13  4.7% 
36 to 40  9  3.2% 
41 to 45  5  1.8% 
46 to 50  8  2.9% 
51 to 55  11  4.0% 
56 to 60  3  1.1% 
61 to 65  3  1.1% 
66 to 70  6  2.2% 
71 to 75  4  1.4% 
76 to 80  3  1.1% 
81 to 85  1  0.4% 
86 to 90  2  0.7% 
91 to 95  2  0.7% 
96 to 100  4  1.4% 
Total  278  100% 
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Source: Bloomberg; World Bank staff analysis 
 
3.2.2  Net listing/delisting activity: Strong delisting trend brings number of listed firms back to 
expected levels 
Despite overall healthy aggregate activity levels, many EGX stocks remain illiquid. To address 
this, the CMA tightened disclosure and trading requirements in 2002 which started a strong 
delisting trend. This trend has been further accentuated the removal of tax benefits of listing and 
M&A activity: almost two out of three companies have delisted since 2002. As a result, the ratio 
of traded to listed firms has improved from 59 percent in 2005 to its current level of over 75 
percent. In 2008:H1, the number of listed firms came down to 375 from a 2002 peak of 1,151, 
making Egypt comparable to Peru in terms of the number of firms per 1,000,000 inhabitants, but 
it is still well ahead to Philippines, Morocco, and Pakistan (Exhibit 3.5). Hence, Egypt may have 
further scope for delistings. The 2006 level seems to be more in line―if slightly higher―with 
expectations when country characteristics are taken into account. In 2008, the number is 4.9, 











2003 2004 2005 2006 2007






















Volume traded (left) Average price (right)  26 
Exhibit 3.5 – Number of listed firms 
Per 1,000,000 inhabitants for selected countries, 2003-07 (left graph) 
Per 1,000,000 inhabitants for Egypt actual versus benchmarked values, 2000-06 (right graph) 
 
Source: EGX, World Federation of Exchanges, World Development Indicators; World Bank staff analysis 
Note for right graph: Benchmarked values based on a worldwide regression model that takes into account GDP per capita, 
population size and density, value of fuel exports to GDP, the poverty gap, and whether the country is an offshore financial 
center. The confidence interval is plus and minus the standard error of the prediction. 
 
3.2.3  Trading activity concentration: value and volume traded concentrations and number of 
stocks with a high fraction of non-zero trading days have been decreasing, but went up 
slightly in 2007-08; many stocks however remain illiquid  
The top ten most active Egyptian companies are responsible for 45-50 percent of total value 
traded (Exhibit 3.6), which is in line with other lower-middle income countries. To filter out 
price effects, Exhibit 3.6 benchmarks Egypt’s 2008 distribution of volume traded (as opposed to 
value traded) for the 100 most-active Bloomberg-covered stocks. Somewhat higher than reported 
by the WFE, in 2008 the top ten most active companies were responsible for 55-60 percent of 
total volume traded. This was only around 40 percent for Amman and Kuwait. Combined, 
Egypt’s 30 most active companies accounted for 90 percent of volume traded. Casablanca and 
Manama were the most concentrated markets. Exhibit  3.6  shows that the distribution has 























































































































































































































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  27 
Exhibit 3.6 – Concentration of stock market activity 
Turnover of top ten active companies as % of total turnover, 2004-07 (upper graph) 
Volume traded of top 100 active firms as % of total firms for selected countries, 2008 (left lower graph) 
Volume traded of top 100 active firms as % of total firms in Egypt, 2005-08 (right lower graph) 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges, Bloomberg; World Bank staff analysis 
Note for lower graphs: 2008 information is up to and including June 20
th. 
 
Stock liquidity in many emerging countries is low and non-trading days occur regularly. 
Therefore, the number of non-trading days is a transparent measure of liquidity. We benchmark 
2008  information  on the fraction of non-trading days to total trading days of 201  Egyptian 
stocks. On average, Egypt’s fraction of non-trading days has been declining and is 11.8 percent 
in 2008 from 38.2 percent in 2004  (Exhibit  3.7).  Clearly  Qatar’s  43 stocks show superior 
liquidity: almost 80 percent of the stocks have 2.5 percent or fewer non-trading days. In contrast, 
Muscat’s and Manama’s markets  show the lowest activity. Egypt’s  201  stocks  (for which 
Bloomberg data is available) show good liquidity with almost 60 percent (118 stocks) of the 
most liquid stocks having 2.5 percent or fewer non-trading days.  
 
Yet,  Egypt’s 20 percent least active stocks show low  liquidity, comparable to Amman, 
Casablanca, and Kuwait. This might warrant additional delisting. In addition, Exhibit 3.7 shows 
that Egypt’s liquidity position has been improving rapidly since 2004. The flattening tail of the 
distribution indicates that an increasingly smaller fraction of stocks are completely illiquid: 
according to Bloomberg, to date, 2008 only saw  14 completely illiquid stocks whereas this 
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Exhibit 3.7 – Trading activity for Bloomberg-covered stocks 
Cumulative distribution of % of non-trading days for selected countries, 2008 (upper left graph) 
Cumulative distribution of % of non-trading days in Egypt, 2004-08 (upper right graph) 
Average non-trading days for selected countries, (lower graph) 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg; World Bank staff analysis 
Note for all graphs: 2008 information is up to and including June 20
th. 
 
This analysis shows that the incidence of highly illiquid stocks has decreased from 30 percent in 
2004 to 10 percent in 2008, implying that EGX is now one of the most liquid markets in MENA. 
However, this finding might be misleading, since Bloomberg covers only 201 stocks, while EGX 
reports the existence of 375 stocks as of mid-2008. Assuming that Egypt’s stocks not reported in 
Bloomberg are highly illiquid, the fraction of illiquid firms would have instead decreased from 
85 percent in 2004 to about 50 percent in 2008, making Egypt a poor regional performer (Exhibit 
3.8). Regardless of this assumption, EGX liquidity has strongly improved since 2004, with the 



















































































































































































Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Abu Dabhi NA 72.2% 31.1% 30.7% 25.4%
Amman 32.0% 24.0% 24.8% 21.8% 19.1%
Cairo 38.2% 31.6% 27.3% 16.1% 11.8%
Casablanca 42.3% 34.6% 28.1% 21.4% 18.2%
Kuwait 20.4% 19.8% 25.8% 21.8% 19.1%
Manama 67.6% 65.2% 65.0% 59.5% 50.0%
Muscat 59.5% 56.9% 59.6% 51.6% 45.4%
Qatar 11.9% 6.7% 4.9% 4.0% 6.4%  29 
Exhibit 3.8 – Trading activity including all Egyptian stocks 
Cumulative distribution of % of non-trading days for selected countries, 2008 (upper left graph) 
Cumulative distribution of % of non-trading days in Egypt, 2004-08 (upper right graph) 
Fraction of illiquid stocks in Bloomberg sample and all listed firms, 2004-07 
 
 
Source: EGX, Bloomberg; World Bank staff analysis 
Notes: To construct the lower graph we assume that the stocks not covered by Bloomberg, are illiquid. This number is added to 
the number of illiquid stocks in Bloomberg and is taken as a fraction of the total number of listed firms reported by CASE. 
Note for upper graphs: 2008 information is up to and including June 20
th. 
 
3.2.4  Transaction costs: Transaction costs have come down and compare favorably to other 
countries; commissions seem to represent the largest cost component 
Market activity and liquidity crucially depend on the cost to execute a trade. The total transaction 
cost is typically thought to consist of three components: a broker commission, stamp or duty 
fees, and the market impact of the transaction, induced by the trade itself. If transaction costs are 
relatively high, prices will not fully reflect all available information since a trade will only take 
place if the value of the information outweighs the transaction cost.  
 
In general, Egypt’s transaction costs have come down and compare favorably to other countries 
(Exhibit  3.9). EGX-specific  transaction costs have been reduced in 2007 from 0.125 per 
thousand of each side of the transaction’s value to 0.12 per thousand (up to a maximum of 
LE5,000). However, during the second quarter of 2007, with almost 70 basis points, Egypt’s 
transaction costs seem high relative to other countries. Indeed, according to EGX, the brokerage 
market  has been relatively concentrated: the top five firms―most  notably  Commercial 
International Brokerage Company, Financial Brokerage Group, and Hermes Securities 
Brokerage―capture 40 percent of the market where currently more than 140 licensed companies 
are active. And competition seem to have deteriorated further: in the first quarter of 2008, the 
two largest brokers (Beltone Securities and Financial Brokerage Group) account for 49 percent 

































































































































































2004 2005 2006 2007
Illiquid in Bloomberg sample Illiquid in sample of all listed companies
Illiquid stocks as % of sample  30 
Egyptian bid-ask spread information is unfortunately not readily available to analyze patterns 
over time. It is however possible to estimate transaction costs based on the incidence of zero-
return trading days, days on which no price movement was recorded. The assumption underlying 
this statistical model is that the marginal investor will not execute a trade unless the profit net of 
all transaction costs is positive. The model’s estimates in Exhibit 3.9 suggest that transaction 
costs have come down in the whole benchmark group compared to 2005. In particular, Egypt’s 
transaction costs have come down from over 130 basis points in 2005 to around 50 basis points 
for 2008 and could be the lowest in the region. 
 
Exhibit 3.9 – Transaction costs 
Transaction cost decomposition in 2007:Q2 for selected countries, basis points (left graph) 
Round-trip transaction cost estimates for the 25 largest stocks in Egypt and Qatar, 2005-08 (right 
Exhibit) 
   
Source: Elkins & McSherry, Bloomberg; World Bank staff analysis 
Note for right graph: 2008 information is up to and including June 20
th. These numbers might not be directly comparable to the 
left graph. The econometric approach is a maximum likelihood, limited dependent variable model that uses daily stock returns to 
estimate transaction costs. Details can be found in Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999). “A new estimate of transaction costs”. 
Review of Financial Studies 12:5. 
 
 
3.3  Capacity to Raise Capital 
3.3.1  International comparison of capital raising activity: Overall, Egypt compares well, but 
privatizations and a relatively low gross fixed capital formation might distort the picture 
Exhibit 3.10 shows that Egypt’s exchange seems to have been fairly successful at raising capital, 
relative to gross fixed private capital formation (GFPCF): 40 percent versus almost 30 percent in 
2006 and 2005, respectively. However these numbers need to be nuanced. First, the 2005 number 
is boosted by privatizations of Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals, Alexandria Mineral Oils Company, and 
Telecom Egypt. In that sense, 2006 gives a better picture, since there were no privatization-
driven IPOs. Excluding, these large privatization IPOs, the Egyptian Exchange was only able to 
raise less than 25 percent of GFPCF in 2005. Secondly, SPO activity is the largest component 
(14.6 percent of GFPCF). Without SPOs, Egypt public offering activity would be lower than 
India’s. Many Egyptian companies are closely held and therefore skip the IPO stage to do an 
SPO.  Thirdly,  Egypt’s  GFPCF as a fraction of GDP  has been low  and hence Exhibit  3.10 
overstates the ability to raise capital. For example, Egyptian GFPCF to GDP has been 
consistently lower than Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan and Philippines since 2002. Only in 
2007, did Egypt surpass Philippines (13.7 percent)―currently the country with the lowest private 
capital formation―but it is still well below the group average of 18.7 percent. Were Egypt rise to 




































































Commission Fees Market impact
bps
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Abu Dabhi 8.79% 6.82% 4.22% 4.83%
Amman 1.95% 1.30% 1.23% 1.24%
Cairo 1.32% 0.74% 0.44% 0.52%
Casablanca 2.48% 1.98% 1.73% 1.23%
Kuwait 3.18% 5.02% 2.93% 2.73%
Muscat 5.43% 7.20% 5.31% 3.50%
Qatar 1.53% 0.87% 0.83% 0.99%  31 
issuances of corporate debt and equity would annually amount to about LE 200 billion (in FY09 
terms) in new corporate bonds, IPOs, and SPOs. 
 
Exhibit 3.10 – Raising capital on exchanges using IPOs, SPOs, and domestic private bonds 
Total capital raised as a % of gross fixed private capital formation, 2005 (upper left graph) 
Total capital raised as a % of gross fixed private capital formation, 2006 (upper right graph) 
Private capital raised as a % of gross fixed private capital formation, 2004-06 (lower graph) 
 
 
Source: EGX, World Federation of Exchanges, World Development Indicators; World Bank staff analysis 
 
3.3.2  Non-privatization public offering activity: SPOs activity is high but not substantial; IPO 
activity is both low and not substantial 
Having peaked at ten in 1998, non-privatization IPO activity has been low since, both in terms of 
numbers and relative to market capitalization (Exhibit 3.11). In fact, IPO activity was completely 
dormant during 2002-04. However, since 2005 there has been some activity, albeit most of it has 
been largely privately placed. For example, the 2005 IPO of Raya Holding for Technology and 
Communications was 100 percent privately placed. 2006 only had two IPOs in the form of El 
Swedy Cables and Al Arafa Investment and Consulting, with a private placement average of 93 
percent. In addition, as a reaction to increasing share prices, Egypt also has been seeing an SPO 
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Exhibit 3.11 – Non-privatization public offering activity 
Number of IPOs and value of IPOs as % of market capitalization (upper left graph) 
Number of SPOs and value of SPOs as % of market capitalization (upper right graph) 
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4  Annex 
 




Alexandria Cement Company Construction And Materials
El Ezz Steel Rebars Construction And Materials X
Helwan Cement Company Construction And Materials
Lecico Egypt Construction And Materials
Misr Beni Suef Cement Company Construction And Materials
Sinai Cement Company Construction And Materials
Suez Cement Company Construction And Materials
Torah Portland Cement Company Construction And Materials
Al Arafa Investment & Consulting Consumer Staples
Alexandria Spinning & Weaving Consumer Staples X
East Delta Flour Mills Consumer Staples
Egypt International Pharmaceuticals Consumer Staples
El Nasr Clothing And Textile Company Consumer Staples X
General Silos And Storage Consumer Staples
Middle & West Delta Mills Consumer Staples
Middle Egypt Flour Mills Consumer Staples
North Cairo Flour Mills Consumer Staples
Oriental Weavers Consumer Staples
Upper Egypt Flour Mills Consumer Staples
Abuo Kir Fertilizers & Chemical Industries Industrial Cyclical
Egyptian Financial And Industrial Co. Industrial Cyclical X
El Ezz Aldekhela Steel Alexandria Industrial Cyclical
Elswedy Cables Holding Company Industrial Cyclical X
Gb Auto S.A.E Industrial Cyclical
Misr Chemical Industries Company Industrial Cyclical
Olympic Group Financial Industrial Cyclical
Orascom Construction Industries Industrial Cyclical X
Paints And Chemical Industries Company Industrial Cyclical
Egyptian For Tourism Resorts Travel & Leisure
Orascom Hotel Holdings Travel & Leisure
Orascom Hotels & Development Travel & Leisure  34 
Exhibit A.2 – Selected indicators by industry 
 
Outliers dropped
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average CAGR
PROFITABILITY INDICATORS
Operating profit margin, %
     Peer group (WS) 13.9 14.2 14.0 15.5 12.0 13.9 -2.9
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 31.5 39.5 44.2 38.8 47.4 40.3 8.5
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 40.4 42.9 49.0 39.9 47.6 44.0 3.3
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 10.1 28.1 26.8 18.6 22.4 21.2 17.3
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 53.0 31.2 28.5 26.0 28.1 33.4 -11.9
ROA, %
     Peer group (WS) 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.2 1.4
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 3.8 6.2 7.1 6.9 9.0 6.6 18.7
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 4.8 6.5 7.1 7.4 9.0 6.9 13.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 1.4 5.3 6.2 6.0 7.0 5.2 39.0
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 4.5 7.7 11.1 11.2 9.5 8.8 16.1
ROE, %
     Peer group (WS) 2.9 3.7 2.2 4.4 4.4 3.5 9.2
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 7.1 10.1 10.9 10.9 13.3 10.4 13.5
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 7.1 10.0 10.3 9.9 14.6 10.4 15.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 3.8 11.5 14.5 11.8 12.1 10.7 26.3
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 2.9 11.9 24.7 21.3 17.9 15.7 44.1
Price to Book ratio
     Peer group (WS) 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.3 9.2
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 0.5 1.4 2.6 4.9 6.5 3.2 66.2
GROWTH RATES
Yearly net fixed asset growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA -3.4 -3.2 -4.3 NA -3.6 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -10.5 -5.7 -9.0 -8.3 -8.4 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -10.5 -6.8 -9.9 -9.6 -9.2 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 17.1 9.0 16.3 17.4 14.9 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA -5.4 19.2 23.6 NA 12.5 NA
Yearly real total assets growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA -0.6 -3.4 -1.5 NA -1.8 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -3.3 1.6 -2.5 0.3 -1.0 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -3.6 0.4 -2.9 -0.6 -1.7 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 12.8 24.8 0.9 21.9 15.1 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA 0.8 31.8 19.5 NA 17.4 NA
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA 5.2 3.1 -2.5 NA 1.9 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA 16.4 3.0 3.1 11.9 8.6 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA 16.4 2.9 3.0 10.3 8.1 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 35.4 3.1 9.0 20.8 17.1 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA 48.3 21.6 16.9 NA 28.9 NA
LEVERAGE INDICATORS
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 50.9 54.7 53.9 52.0 55.8 53.5 1.9
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 49.1 61.6 58.1 66.0 78.3 62.6 9.8
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 49.1 59.3 50.4 55.9 79.0 58.7 10.0
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 60.0 76.3 73.5 82.1 69.7 72.3 3.0
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 61.0 59.6 69.9 82.1 61.9 66.9 0.3
Short term debt to tot. liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 14.3 17.2 15.7 12.9 15.6 15.2 1.8
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 9.6 8.5 4.3 8.0 8.8 7.9 -1.6
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 9.6 8.5 9.1 6.8 8.8 8.6 -1.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 26.1 1.3 0.9 11.3 0.1 7.9 -65.9
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 18.4 19.4 11.3 25.0 24.3 19.7 5.7
Total debt to Equity, %
     Peer group (WS) 24.1 18.1 11.3 12.3 17.2 16.6 -6.6
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 6.4 8.4 12.8 4.5 4.9 7.4 -5.4
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 4.2 6.9 10.7 4.0 4.1 6.0 -0.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 119.4 62.7 36.2 37.8 32.6 57.8 -22.9
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 74.5 63.8 70.2 42.8 44.3 59.1 -9.9
Travel and leisure, medians  35 
 
Outliers dropped
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average CAGR
PROFITABILITY INDICATORS
Operating profit margin, %
     Peer group (WS) 13.8 16.3 17.3 18.6 14.4 16.1 0.8
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 10.8 7.2 15.1 13.3 17.9 12.9 10.7
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 8.9 6.5 11.7 10.3 13.5 10.2 8.7
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 15.1 17.6 31.7 26.5 26.2 23.4 11.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 19.8 30.6 37.0 31.2 20.3 27.8 0.4
ROA, %
     Peer group (WS) 3.7 5.2 6.9 7.0 6.4 5.8 11.5
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 4.7 4.4 8.7 10.9 14.0 8.6 24.1
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 4.1 3.9 5.5 7.6 9.5 6.1 18.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 6.3 11.2 12.8 13.0 14.4 11.6 17.9
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 9.5 14.5 20.7 18.1 10.7 14.7 2.3
ROE, %
     Peer group (WS) 4.9 8.7 12.2 14.2 10.5 10.1 16.4
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 10.0 12.2 18.8 21.7 23.1 17.2 18.2
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 10.6 10.5 14.4 21.4 24.2 16.2 18.0
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 8.8 15.9 27.0 24.0 22.6 19.7 20.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 12.8 20.8 35.4 22.9 18.7 22.1 7.8
Price to Book ratio
     Peer group (WS) 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.3 13.7
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 1.5 2.8 3.3 2.9 1.9 2.5 5.0
GROWTH RATES
Yearly net fixed asset growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA -4.1 -7.0 -2.7 NA -4.6 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -12.5 -8.6 -9.1 -8.1 -9.6 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -11.0 -9.4 -7.9 -7.0 -8.8 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -13.7 -7.2 -10.8 -10.5 -10.6 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA -14.0 -6.0 11.8 NA -2.7 NA
Yearly real total assets growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA 1.6 2.8 3.4 NA 2.6 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -6.4 -0.1 -2.1 5.3 -0.8 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -5.2 -0.1 -1.5 7.3 0.1 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -8.5 0.2 -8.2 1.0 -3.9 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA -5.4 5.7 3.6 NA 1.3 NA
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA 14.8 10.3 7.1 NA 10.7 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA 10.3 8.2 11.1 2.7 8.1 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA 1.8 4.4 12.1 2.9 5.3 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 18.0 16.6 10.1 2.5 11.8 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA 14.2 32.1 19.2 NA 21.8 NA
LEVERAGE INDICATORS
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 57.8 62.1 60.7 63.1 53.2 59.4 -1.7
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 70.7 76.9 84.3 87.0 86.8 81.1 4.2
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 75.2 84.6 84.9 88.6 88.2 84.3 3.2
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 53.8 60.0 44.4 56.0 70.7 57.0 5.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 53.6 55.3 51.1 67.8 66.7 58.9 4.5
Short term debt to tot. liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 16.3 15.8 15.2 17.3 14.6 15.8 -2.1
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 20.7 18.6 23.4 22.7 26.9 22.5 5.4
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 23.3 22.8 25.8 27.7 32.4 26.4 6.8
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 4.3 6.5 0.2 5.6 16.3 6.6 30.8
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 20.1 18.8 14.5 13.4 30.9 19.5 9.0
Total debt to Equity, %
     Peer group (WS) 14.3 15.0 19.3 31.3 27.5 21.5 14.0
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 37.6 36.6 40.9 34.2 26.3 35.2 -6.9
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 26.1 41.3 30.8 33.1 24.6 31.2 -1.2
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 53.1 27.8 74.6 34.8 29.5 44.0 -11.1
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 52.2 32.0 62.2 23.6 61.8 46.4 3.5
Construction and materials, medians  36 
 
Outliers dropped
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average CAGR
PROFITABILITY INDICATORS
Operating profit margin, %
     Peer group (WS) 7.8 8.1 8.1 9.0 8.8 8.4 2.5
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.3 7.3 6.9 2.6
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 6.5 6.7 7.1 7.6 7.3 7.0 2.3
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 5.0 5.0 7.0 7.3 6.8 6.2 6.4
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 9.1 5.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 5.8 -15.2
ROA, %
     Peer group (WS) 5.6 4.6 4.9 5.8 6.3 5.4 2.2
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 7.4 6.7 5.3 6.0 6.9 6.5 -1.5
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 5.6 6.6 4.8 5.5 6.2 5.7 1.9
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 8.7 7.7 10.1 10.3 8.8 9.1 0.1
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 9.9 9.8 10.7 8.6 10.2 9.8 0.7
ROE, %
     Peer group (WS) 7.0 6.1 6.4 8.7 10.1 7.6 7.6
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 12.3 16.9 14.0 13.8 12.5 13.9 0.4
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 11.6 16.8 12.6 13.7 12.3 13.4 1.2
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 21.6 17.4 23.8 21.0 16.7 20.1 -5.0
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 18.4 18.6 21.7 21.2 24.8 21.0 6.1
Price to Book ratio
     Peer group (WS) 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 8.5
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 0.8 0.9 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.2 9.3
GROWTH RATES
Yearly net fixed asset growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA -1.8 -3.3 -5.3 NA -3.4 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -11.9 -5.9 -8.3 -8.9 -8.7 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -12.0 -5.7 -8.4 -9.7 -9.0 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -11.5 -7.4 2.8 -3.7 -4.9 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA -9.2 -6.4 -3.2 NA -6.3 NA
Yearly real total assets growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA 2.1 -1.4 -1.7 NA -0.3 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -4.2 -1.8 0.2 -1.1 -1.7 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -4.6 -2.4 0.3 -2.9 -2.4 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -3.1 -1.1 -1.5 1.7 -1.0 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA 7.5 1.4 -5.1 NA 1.3 NA
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA 5.2 0.1 3.6 NA 3.0 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA 0.9 -3.5 -2.5 -2.5 -1.9 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA 0.3 -1.8 -1.6 -0.7 -0.9 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 4.7 -7.9 -7.9 -3.6 -3.7 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA 4.6 -12.9 -8.0 NA -5.4 NA
LEVERAGE INDICATORS
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 71.7 72.6 69.0 68.0 69.0 70.1 -0.8
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 89.3 86.5 90.3 89.4 90.0 89.1 0.2
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 89.2 76.9 87.1 87.7 90.0 86.2 0.2
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 89.3 96.9 97.2 96.6 91.9 94.4 0.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 86.4 95.4 97.2 96.7 96.8 94.5 2.3
Short term debt to tot. liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 90.8 94.8 95.4 95.3 96.0 94.5 1.1
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 31.5 35.3 28.4 30.1 30.7 31.2 -0.5
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 66.8 61.9 66.1 61.6 64.9 64.3 -0.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 12.2 27.8 13.7 12.5 24.1 18.1 14.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 58.4 68.5 57.7 60.3 60.0 61.0 0.5
Total debt to Equity, %
     Peer group (WS) 29.9 27.0 35.4 30.9 30.4 30.7 0.3
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 28.9 25.6 26.1 21.3 19.4 24.3 -7.6
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 28.1 25.2 23.9 23.2 20.7 24.2 -6.0
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 28.9 31.7 27.3 10.3 16.2 22.9 -10.9
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 32.4 20.6 23.0 8.6 20.7 21.0 -8.6
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Outliers dropped
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average CAGR
PROFITABILITY INDICATORS
Operating profit margin, %
     Peer group (WS) 7.5 8.6 8.4 7.9 7.9 8.1 0.9
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 9.4 11.5 10.7 9.8 11.4 10.6 4.0
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 8.1 10.4 10.4 9.8 10.7 9.9 5.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 18.3 17.7 22.5 16.7 22.2 19.5 3.9
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 19.1 14.5 23.4 19.6 12.4 17.8 -8.3
ROA, %
     Peer group (WS) 4.5 5.9 5.3 5.3 5.7 5.3 5.1
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 5.0 5.7 7.8 7.8 9.1 7.1 12.6
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 5.1 5.5 7.6 7.6 8.9 7.0 11.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 5.0 8.9 13.7 12.2 12.1 10.4 19.6
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 10.3 11.9 13.2 14.3 16.7 13.3 10.2
ROE, %
     Peer group (WS) 5.4 8.5 7.9 8.8 9.6 8.0 11.9
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 10.4 13.8 14.9 15.7 19.3 14.8 13.1
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 10.2 13.7 13.8 14.8 18.4 14.2 12.5
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 15.1 22.4 28.6 19.3 26.0 22.3 11.5
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 19.8 21.7 25.2 25.0 24.8 23.3 4.6
Price to Book ratio
     Peer group (WS) 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 5.0
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 1.2 1.5 2.4 2.3 3.5 2.2 24.8
GROWTH RATES
Yearly net fixed asset growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA -3.7 -4.8 -5.0 NA -4.5 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -11.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.5 -10.4 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -10.7 -9.9 -10.0 -10.8 -10.4 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -13.8 -10.2 -10.7 -8.6 -10.8 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA -11.0 -4.2 5.6 NA -3.2 NA
Yearly real total assets growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA 6.1 -0.2 -0.3 NA 1.9 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA -4.7 0.7 0.4 -0.8 -1.1 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA -4.9 0.8 0.5 -1.2 -1.2 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA -0.4 0.7 -1.7 -0.1 -0.4 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA -0.5 0.8 7.2 NA 2.5 NA
Yearly real sales growth, %
     Peer group (WS) NA 15.9 5.3 5.1 NA 8.8 NA
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) NA 11.2 7.2 2.2 6.9 6.9 NA
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) NA 7.6 6.8 3.6 6.9 6.2 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) NA 19.4 9.0 -6.7 17.8 9.9 NA
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) NA 20.8 9.0 12.2 NA 14.0 NA
LEVERAGE INDICATORS
Current liabilities to total liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 72.8 74.3 77.3 74.5 75.9 75.0 0.9
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 84.2 82.4 91.1 83.5 87.4 85.7 0.8
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 85.9 82.7 92.1 84.0 88.7 86.7 0.6
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 37.1 61.4 59.4 70.4 75.6 60.8 15.3
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 76.6 73.6 72.5 79.3 84.1 77.2 1.9
Short term debt to tot. liabilities, %
     Peer group (WS) 20.7 19.9 18.1 20.4 17.2 19.3 -3.6
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 25.7 28.1 26.8 25.0 23.1 25.7 -2.1
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 28.8 27.8 27.8 25.9 22.2 26.5 -5.1
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 15.5 29.4 22.3 22.2 35.6 25.0 18.1
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 22.2 32.2 23.5 32.8 50.6 32.3 17.9
Total debt to Equity, %
     Peer group (WS) 18.7 19.4 16.0 20.7 19.3 18.8 0.6
     Egypt - Universe (Coface) 21.6 17.7 19.4 23.4 22.1 20.8 0.5
     Egypt - Second tier (Coface) 21.1 14.7 11.7 23.0 19.8 18.0 -1.3
     Egypt - Top tier (Coface) 31.0 33.8 61.6 68.8 87.9 56.6 23.2
     Egypt - Top tier (WS) 30.6 43.2 60.9 62.3 16.3 42.7 -11.8
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Exhibit A.4 – Number of firms simultaneously covered by Bloomberg, January 1
st 2003-
June 20
th 2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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